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Navigating the Pitfalls of  
Maritime Mediations
Introduction
The shipping industry in the United States often involves the performance of complex 
maritime contracts.  It is not uncommon for the parties to these contracts to engage 
in disputes when one of these contracts is breached by one of the contracting 
parties. When this happens, there are four primary methods for resolving these 
disputes: direct negotiation, litigation, arbitration, or mediation. 
Background
This article will first briefly examine the particulars of the primary methods for 
resolving maritime contract disputes. The article will then conclude by focusing on 
some of the pitfalls that parties should avoid when attempting to resolve a maritime 
contract dispute. 
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Bunker Intermediaries and their Rights to a 
Maritime Lien Under CIMLA1
Introduction  
Fuel intermediaries supply a valuable service in today’s shipping industry, playing 
a supporting role in the operation of cargo carriers, by box or in bulk. Working for 
the vessel, fuel intermediaries order “bunkers”2 from local physical suppliers and 
arrange for the suppliers to “stem”3 the vessel when she reaches the specified port. 
Such a service is crucial where vessels run international routes on tight schedules 
and risk delay due to language barriers, changes in currencies or changes in port 
requirements. Regarded within the industry as “local experts,”4 intermediaries 
leverage their knowledge, technology, resources and people to connect the vessel 
with the most reliable, efficient, safest and low-cost local bunker suppliers at each 
port, allowing the vessel to voyage on.5  The largest international liner6 companies 
rely on bunker intermediaries out of convenience and the vessels running tramp 
services7 rely on them out of necessity.8 
Given the crucial service bunker intermediaries provide, and the extent to which 
vessels rely on them to continue moving, one would assume that they would be 
entitled to a lien for necessaries, specifically a lien for the supply of bunkers, under 
the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (CIMLA).9 However, Judge 
Katherine B. Forrest, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, did not agree with such an assumption when she applied CIMLA stricti 
juris and ruled that O.W. Bunker & Trading A/S, one of the world’s largest bunker 
intermediaries, was not entitled to a maritime lien for the supply of bunkers.10 In 
her opinion, Judge Forrest is unsympathetic to the proposition that brokers like 
O.W. Bunker contribute to the overall purpose that CIMLA and the maritime lien 
for necessaries serve – to encourage private investment in the vessel in the form 
of commercial credit by securing the creditor.11  Nevertheless, an in depth review of 
the case law and legislative history behind the maritime lien for necessaries and 
O.W. Bunker’s success in the market place suggest that Judge Forrest’s view of 
bunker intermediaries is unsupported and unfounded. Judge Forrest misapplied 
stricti juris when interpreting the maritime lien for necessaries and O.W. Bunker’s 
market success should persuade that its services constituted necessaries for which 
a lien is authorized under CIMLA.
This paper focuses on how bunker intermediaries like O.W. Bunker contribute to 
the goal served by the lien for necessaries and why ship owners are better off with 
them than without them. Part I outlines the current state of the law governing the 
lien for necessaries and provides an overview of the legislative history behind the 
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lien for necessaries. Part II relates the rise and fall of O.W. Bunker, as well as how 
the company’s structure resulted in the litigation of a novel issue. Part II details the 
specific transaction and issue at the center of Judge Forrest’s ruling in ING Bank 
N.V.  v. M/V Temara et. al. Finally, Part III analyzes why Judge Forrest’s decision and 
reasoning are misguided and how fuel intermediaries like O.W. Bunker contribute to 
the overall purpose thereof and are therefore entitled to a CIMLA lien for necessaries.
I. The Maritime Lien for Necessaries  
a.   CIMLA is the current body of law governing maritime liens and the maritime 
lien for necessaries. 
The success of a truly global economy depends heavily on an efficient and reliable 
international shipping industry. Suppliers of a broad range of goods and services 
are responsible for such efficiency and reliability.12 This line of work is often risky 
and uncertain for suppliers13 who must furnish the vessel with goods and services 
quickly so that the vessel can immediately turn around and be put back onto sea.14 
In today’s demanding and competitive market, the vessel and shipper’s success 
depend on decreased port time and increased speed.15 Therefore, there is a good 
chance that a vessel may depart before paying for supplies.16 
A lien for necessaries is a maritime lien. Maritime liens keep “the channels of maritime 
commerce open by ensuring that people who service vessels have an efficient way 
of demanding reimbursement for their labor and are thus willing to perform the 
services necessary to keep the vessels in operation.”17 Since the maritime lien is 
an extraordinary and “secret” right,18 it is disfavored by law and courts have held 
that the statutory provisions creating maritime liens are stricti juris.19 Perhaps new 
sorts of maritime liens ought to be disfavored by law and be interpreted stricti juris 
to guard against windfall resulting from their “secrecy.”20 However, when analyzing 
whether a supplier is entitled to a lien for necessaries, CIMLA should be interpreted 
with regard to the generous approach to liens for necessaries that has prevailed so 
far.21  The lien benefits those who supply goods and services for the vessel on credit 
by granting them an in rem claim22 against the vessel itself should the vessel owners 
abscond.23 At the same time, a lien for necessaries serves the vessel by allowing it 
to receive required goods and services more readily, so that it keeps voyaging free 
of delay or obstacle.24 
To minimize this risk, those who (1) provide necessaries (2) to a vessel (3) upon 
the order of the owner of the vessel or “persons... presumed to have authority to 
procure necessaries for a vessel”25 are entitled to a maritime lien against a vessel 
by law.26 A maritime lien is a secret and “special property right in a vessel given to a 
creditor by law as security for a debt or claim arising from some service rendered to 
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the ship to facilitate her use in navigation or from an injury caused by the vessel in 
navigable waters.”27 It only arises out of a maritime transaction, such as a maritime 
contract or tort, but it does not arise out of every maritime transaction,28 making it 
an extraordinary right.29 
b.   The history of the maritime lien for necessaries supports a broad 
interpretation rather than the stricti juris interpretation. 
A maritime lien for necessaries is anything but a novel concept. Since 1789,30 courts 
have understood that a continuous flow of commerce depends on a ship’s ability 
to obtain services at ports of call, which depends on suppliers being guaranteed 
payment.31 The lien for necessaries is the product of such understanding. Courts 
began granting suppliers of food, vessel repairs, towing services and other 
necessaries a lien against the vessel for the services rendered, making or finding 
such a remedy part of maritime common law.32
It was not until much later that Congress became interested in the subject. Judicially 
enforced since 1819, the Home Port Doctrine denied a lien to suppliers in a ship’s 
“home port.”33  This distinction invited resort to state lien law, which threatened the 
national uniformity of law on the subject.34 Despite a federal court’s call on Congress 
to abolish the doctrine in 1874,35 it was not until thirty-six years later that Congress 
answered with the Federal Maritime Lien Act of 1910.  
The Federal Maritime Lien Act of 1910 (FMLA) granted a maritime lien to those who 
furnished “repairs, supplies, or other necessaries, including the use of dry-dock or 
marine railway.”36 The Act was Congress’ first attempt to broaden the maritime lien 
afforded suppliers by eliminating the distinction between home and foreign ports 
and eliminating any presumption of credit to the owner (as opposed to the vessel).37 
However, the courts’ narrow interpretation of the Act continued to threaten national 
uniformity of lien law and dissatisfied Congress.38 Therefore, in 1920, Congress 
enacted the Ship Mortgage Act and amended the wording to read “repairs, 
supplies, towage, use of dry-dock or marine railway, or other necessaries.”39 Such 
amendments reinforced Congress’ intent that the Act be construed broadly, liberally 
and uniformly so as to benefit the supplier.40 Following these amendments, courts 
began interpreting and applying the maritime lien for necessaries more broadly.41 
A leading case taking the broader approach and affording deference to Congress is 
Equilease Corp v. M/V Sampson.42 In Equilease, the Fifth Circuit held that “furnishing” 
does not require the actual delivery of goods or services to a vessel because such 
a “physical delivery requirement would prevent intangible services useful to a 
vessel from being ‘necessaries’ under the Lien Act.”43 The Court acknowledged that 
if the Act’s purpose is to “encourage private investment in the maritime industry 
by protecting investors” then to hold that “furnishing” requires physical delivery 
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would defeat this purpose by “layering technicalities onto” and narrowing the Act’s 
interpretation.44  The Eleventh Circuit also recognized congressional intent when 
it interpreted the lien for necessaries broadly, granting a lien for necessaries to a 
shipyard that had made repairs on a vessel that, at the time, was not “in navigation.”45 
The Court recognized that “Congress created maritime liens to protect both ships” 
and suppliers.46 The Court argued that “Congress could not have intended as the 
need for protection increased, the law’s protection would retract.”47 
Since 1920, the direction of the lien for necessaries has not changed. In 1988, 
Congress “revise[d], consolidate[d], and enact[ed] certain laws related to shipping 
definitions and maritime commercial instruments and liens as subtitle III of title 
46.”48 Among the revisions was the deletion of “Chapters 313, 315 – Reserved” and 
the substitution of “Chapter 313-Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens.”49 
Additionally, Congress replaced the word “furnishing” with the word “providing.”50 
However, the relevant House of Representative report states that this change 
should not “result in changes in substance, and therefore [it] should not impair the 
precedent value of earlier judicial decisions or other interpretations.”51 Therefore, in 
determining whether a supplier is entitled to a maritime lien for necessaries against 
a vessel, it is important to review the legislative history and original purpose of the 
lien, thereby adhering to prior judicial decisions. In this instance, the legislative 
history supports a broad interpretation.  
II.  An Overview of O.W. Bunker and Judge Forrest’s Ruling in 
ING N.V. v. M/V Temara.
a.  The Rise and Fall of O.W. Bunker. 
O.W. Bunker & Trading A/S, established in Denmark in 1980, was one of the 
world’s largest bunker intermediaries with operations in twenty-nine countries.52 
O.W. worked with both vessel owners and charterers and local bunker suppliers 
to facilitate and arrange the purchase and delivery of bunkers to the vessel.53 A 
vessel owner or charterer would contract with O.W. for bunkers.54 Despite having 
the ability to physically supply bunkers to vessels,55 O.W. itself almost never did. 56 
O.W. worked through a chain of sub-contracts with third parties.57 Upon entering 
into a contract with a vessel owner or charterer to supply bunkers, O.W. would then 
subcontract with one if its subsidiaries.58 The subsidiary would then contract with a 
local supplier to fulfill the order. 59 The physical supplier delivered the bunkers to the 
vessel and obtained a receipt signed by the master.60 O.W. would invoice the vessel 
owner or charterer and the local supplier would invoice O.W. or its subsidiary.61 Upon 
payment from the vessel owner or charterer, O.W. would pay the local supplier.62 
There was a mark-up from the price charged by the physical supplier to the price 
charged by O.W. The difference between these two prices was O.W.’s profit.63  
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The system worked until November 7, 2014 when O.W. Bunker & Trading A/S filed 
for bankruptcy in Denmark as a result of company fraud.64 It did not take long for 
O.W’s subsidiaries to follow suit, seeking bankruptcy protections in courts all over 
the world.65 The general insolvency of the O.W. network left many of the remaining 
parties in this chain of intermediaries unpaid and worried.66 This resulted in a number 
of competing claims filed worldwide by physical suppliers against the vessels and 
vessel owners.67 As the contractual supplier, O.W. Bunker had a claim against the 
vessel owners flowing from the supply contract.68 Given O.W. Bunker’s financial 
status, the local suppliers feared that they would become O.W. Bunker’s unsecured 
creditors and never fully recover.69 Therefore, the physical suppliers asserted a lien 
against the vessel itself, regardless of whether the owner or charterer had already 
paid O.W.70 To further complicate matters, in December 2013, a number of O.W. 
entities had assigned their rights in the bunker supply contracts with the vessels to 
ING Bank N.V.71 Such assignment prompted ING to assert a maritime lien of its own 
against the vessels of O.W. customers.72  
The vessel owners, now faced with multiple potential claims for payment, did not 
know which party to pay and were not going to pay several times for one delivery 
of bunkers. Moreover, the vessel owner feared that if it paid the wrong party the 
vessel would remain subject to an in rem arrest by another party asserting a claim.73 
In response to competing claims, vessel owners filed interpleader actions.74 The 
question of which party is entitled to payment for the fuel is at issue in more than 
one hundred and fifty cases in the courts of the United States and elsewhere around 
the world.75 So far, only a handful of district courts have answered this question by 
reference to U.S. law. District courts in the Eastern District of Louisiana76 and the 
Southern District of New York77 have ruled in favor of O.W. [and ING Bank] because 
O.W. was privy to the contract with the ship owner or charterer. However, despite 
previous decisions in favor of O.W. within the Southern District of New York, Judge 
Katherine B. Forrest took a different approach. 
b.   Judge Forrest Rules that O.W. Bunker Is Not Entitled to a Maritime Lien for 
Necessaries and Does Not Contribute to the Overall Purpose of the Lien 
because it does not meet the “provided” portion of CIMLA. 
ING Bank N.V. (“ING”) filed a number of cases asserting rights to the interpleaded 
funds due and payable to O.W. Bunker (“O.W.”) for the provision of bunkers of fuel oil 
to vessels in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
In each of the five cases addressed in the opinion for ING Bank N.V. v. M/V Temara 
et al., ING moved for summary judgment, alleging that O.W. Bunker had maritime 
liens for bunkers supplied to the vessels, and that O.W had validly assigned its rights 
to receive any money due pursuant to such liens to ING.78 Except where otherwise 
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indicated, the following is taken from the findings of fact by Judge Forrest in her 
opinion in the case of the Temara.79 
In each case, the charterer entered into a contract with O.W. for the supply of 
bunkers. That contract was between parties at arms’ length; it did not authorize O.W. 
to act as the vessel’s agent or representative in procuring bunkers. Afterwards, O.W. 
employed the services of one of its subsidiaries serving as a “bunker intermediary.” 
Shortly after O.W. and O.W. USA entered into an agreement, O.W. USA contracted 
with a local supplier to physically supply the bunkers to the vessel. According to 
the court, the record was silent as to O.W.’s knowledge of the contract between 
its subsidiary and the local supplier, and does not support that O.W. agreed to any 
terms of that contract. When the local supplier delivered, the vessel’s Chief Engineer 
signed a receipt and stamped it with the names of the charterer and vessel. 
O.W. then issued an invoice to the vessel owner or charterer, stating that payment 
was to be made to ING Bank within thirty days. O.W.’s invoice made no reference 
to either the O.W. subsidiary involved or the local supplier. Meanwhile, the local 
supplier issued its own invoice to the O.W. subsidiary involved. That invoice made 
no reference to O.W. the parent or the vessel owner or charterer. Neither O.W. (or 
ING) nor the local supplier were ever paid on their invoices. 
Judge Forrest applied stricti juris and denied ING’s motions for summary judgment 
on its claim to a maritime lien, and ruled that O.W. could not assert a maritime lien 
because it did not experience any loss or suffer financial risk and, therefore, did not 
meet the “provided” prong of the test under CIMLA.80 Judge Forrest acknowledged 
that courts in the past had granted a lien to various entities and intermediaries 
contracting with third parties for the provision of necessaries to a vessel.81 However, 
Judge Forrest argued that such an outcome is only warranted when the contract 
supplier has already paid its subcontractor.82 
III.   Analysis
Judge Forrest’s application of stricti juris and her position that intermediaries like 
O.W. Bunker do not serve the purpose of a lien for necessaries is contradicted by 
both case law and legislative history. The lien for necessaries has been around for 
centuries and has developed as a result of general maritime law. Its purpose is to 
encourage investment in vessels and the marine industry and established case law 
and legislative history support a broad construction to effectuate this purpose.83 
CIMLA’s “provided” qualification should be interpreted broadly in accordance with 
established case law and legislative history and O.W. Bunker’s market success 
should persuade that its services constituted necessaries for which a lien is 
authorized by CIMLA.
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a.   CIMLA’s “provided” qualification should be interpreted broadly in 
accordance with established case law and legislative history
i.     Judge Forrest misapplied stricti juris when interpreting the maritime 
lien for necessaries. 
In her opinion, Judge Forrest misapplies stricti juris when interpreting the maritime 
lien for necessaries because established case law and legislative history call for a 
broad interpretation of the lien for necessaries. Judge Forrest recognizes that the 
goal of the lien for necessaries is to “facilitate maritime commerce by ‘protect[ing]…..
suppliers who in good faith furnish necessaries to a vessel.’”84 Arising out of general 
maritime law, the lien balanced the interests of suppliers and shipowners to keep 
vessels active in trade.85 When courts began interpreting the lien too narrowly, 
Congress took action to broaden its scope by passing the Lien Act in 1910. 
Subsequent actions by Congress have been carried out with the same intent – to 
broaden and clarify the scope of the lien for necessaries so as to effectuate its 
purpose.86 As the maritime industry evolves, what is considered necessary likewise 
evolves and, in turn, how those necessaries are provided evolve. Furthermore, what 
is required to keep vessels active in the maritime industry is determined on a case-
by-case-basis, accounting for the function of a particular vessel and the goods or 
services involved.87 Therefore, the lien for necessaries must be flexible and courts 
must interpret CIMLA broadly in order to account for changing conditions in the 
maritime industry. 
ii.   Even if the lien for necessaries was to be interpreted stricti juris, 
Judge Forrest misinterpreted it by creating her own definition of the 
term “provided.” 
Judge Forrest misapplied stricti juris by creating a new definition of the term “provided” 
instead of adhering to the broad definition supported by case law and legislative 
history. Judge Forrest believes that the “key issue in determining whether O.W. Bunker 
has a maritime lien for necessaries is what the term ‘provided’ means.”88 This is not 
an issue at all because the courts and Congress have already defined “provided” 
through their definition of “furnished.” The Lien Act of 1910 awarded a maritime lien 
to those who “furnished repairs, supplies or other necessaries, including the use of 
drydock or marine railway.”89 In 1920, Congress changed the wording to “any person 
furnishing repairs, towage, use of dry dock or marine railway, or other necessaries,….
shall have a maritime lien”90 because it was frustrated by the court’s continued narrow 
interpretation of the Act.91 After this change, in an effort to effectuate Congress’ intent, 
courts interpreted “furnished” broadly92 and cautioned against “layering technicalities 
onto” the term to avoid preventing certain types of goods and services useful for the 
ship from being considered “necessaries” under the Lien Act. 93 
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In 1988, Congress re-codified the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 and replaced the 
word “furnishing” with the word “providing.”94 Congress clarified that this change 
in wording does not change the substance or impair the precedent value of earlier 
judicial decisions.95 The term “furnished” has been interpreted broadly. Congress 
stated that “providing” means “furnishing.”96 Therefore, Judge Forrest was mistaken 
in searching for a precise definition of the term “provided.” She should have followed 
the broad definition of the term “furnished,” applied by previous courts. Instead, 
Judge Forrest defined “provided” as putting oneself at financial risk.97 Such a 
definition is unfounded and unsupported in prior case law and legislative history. 
The definition goes against the purpose of the lien for necessaries. In adding an 
extra layer onto “provided,” it risks discouraging private investment in the maritime 
industry by suppliers of valuable goods and services that may structure their 
transactions in the same way as O.W. Bunker. 
Moreover, even if “provided” meant putting oneself in financial risk, it can hardly 
be said that O.W. did not take on risk in delivering the bunkers. As a party to the 
contract, if there was an issue with the delivery of bunkers to the vessel, the vessel 
owners or charterers would have a claim against O.W. Bunker, not the physical 
supplier. Additionally, O.W.  sold the bunkers at one price but the rate of bunkers 
changes daily.98 The price of bunkers on the day where the contract was agreed 
upon and the price on the day of delivery could have been dramatically different and 
O.W. had to account for the difference.99 Finally, O.W. took on financial risk to supply 
the bunkers to the vessel because it was using all its resources to find the best price 
and best physical supplier to supply the bunkers. Clearly, O.W. meets the “provided” 
portion of CIMLA. 
b.   The service that O.W. Bunker, and bunker intermediaries alike, provides is 
necessary because it is required for the vessel’s continued operation, as is 
evidenced by the widespread success of O.W. Bunker in the market place. 
The term “other necessaries” has also been interpreted broadly and expansively100 
to effectuate the purpose of the lien for necessaries and “encourage the provision of 
goods and services that keep vessels commercially active.”101 Any goods or services 
that are provided to the vessel and required for the vessel to continue operation 
are considered “necessaries.”102 The term is limited to repairs and supplies “fit and 
proper for the use of a ship.”103 The test is whether what is furnished “is within the 
reasonable needs of the ship’s business.”104 In today’s maritime industry, a vessel’s 
success depends on increased efficiency and reliability. Any goods or services that 
decrease port time, increase speed and allow the vessel to be immediately turned 
around and put back onto sea qualify as “other necessaries” and those that supply 
them are entitled to a lien for necessaries.105 Therefore, O.W. Bunker, and bunker 
intermediaries alike, provide a necessary service to vessels by acting as a local 
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expert capable of delivering bunkers, economic, technical and safety support to 
“keep her out of danger and enable her to perform her particular function.”106 
O.W. contributes to the vessel’s continued operation by providing economic 
support to the vessel. O.W. monitors the daily changing price of bunkers and the 
most reliable sources of fuel according to the vessel’s needs and estimated time of 
arrival.107  This service cuts costs for ship owners and charterers because it saves 
them from expending their own resources for such endeavors and allows them to 
focus on the vessel’s voyage.108 In addition, O.W. structures its transactions to allow 
the vessel to move quickly and efficiently through the port and contribute to her 
quick turn around.109 
O.W. contributes to the vessel’s continued operation by providing technical support 
to the vessel. O.W. puts people in the field at each port. Therefore, it is capable of 
updating ship owners and charterers on any recent developments in environmental 
regulations110 or port restrictions.111 This information allows the vessels to plan 
accordingly and to prepare for entering and exiting various ports around the world. 
Moreover, O.W. is capable of helping the vessel comply with these requirements, 
allowing the vessel to be prepared and avoid delays or fines.112 Such specialized 
knowledge is crucial to the ship functioning efficiently and being able to continue 
moving so as to keep the flow of commerce open.
Finally, O.W.’s services keep the vessel “out of danger” by identifying the most 
reliable and secure sources of fuel in foreign ports. O.W. provides bunkers in a 
way that accounts for the differences in the people, logistics, politics, languages, 
currencies and the handling of money depending on the country.113 If a vessel is 
operating or trading in a more dangerous or higher risk port, O.W. leverages its 
local expertise to find the safest source of fuel for the vessel.114 Ultimately, this set 
up ensured that the delivery of fuel to the vessel went smoothly and the vessel 
could voyage on. The vessel’s needs are the driving factor behind a good or service 
qualifying as “necessary.”115 O.W.’s success in the market suggests that ship owners 
and charterers found this service convenient and helpful for business. Otherwise, 
vessel interests would have dealt directly with the physical suppliers and would have 
rejected the higher price, effectively a finder’s fee, charged by O.W.
Conclusion
The purpose of the maritime lien for necessaries is to encourage private investment 
in the shipping industry. The shipping industry is constantly evolving and the law 
must evolve with it in order to ensure an efficient flow of business and commerce. 
Judge Forrest misapplied stricti juris to the lien for necessaries. The lien must be 
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interpreted broadly to account for changes in the industry and the case law and 
legislative history support such an interpretation. Judge Forrest’s narrow and 
technical definition of “provided” is inconsistent with the overall purpose of the lien. 
Her definition discourages investment in the shipping industry by denying a lien for 
necessaries to whole group of suppliers providing necessaries or goods through 
transactions structured like those of O.W. Bunker. The market success of O.W. 
Bunker, and other fuel intermediaries, suggest that this could have a severe impact on 
the flow of commerce. Finally, O.W. Bunker did put itself at financial risk in providing 
bunkers to the vessels as is evidenced by its contracts with the vessel owners or 
charterers and the efforts it took in providing such resources to the vessels. 
Judge Forrest’s decision is currently up on appeal in the Second Circuit. 116 It should 
be noted that at least one other judge in the Southern District of New York has 
declined to follow Judge Forrest’s decision in the Temara.117 It will be interesting to 
see how these interpleader cases are decided in the future. As litigation continues, 
regarding O.W. Bunker, courts should consider the purpose of the maritime lien for 
necessaries and the frustrations to the shipping industry that could ensue if bunker 
intermediaries like O.W. Bunker were denied a lien for necessaries. 
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